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Abstract:  Ghanaian manufacturing firms face a highly risky environment. Firms may 
attempt to manage these risks by undertaking production, input, and investment strategies 
designed to lower profit variability. Mean-variance analysis implies, however, that these 
strategies involve a trade-off with lower expected profits. This paper investigates the extent to 
which more risk averse managers who face high risks attempt to smooth profits at the expense 
of lower average profits. We use data from the Ghana Manufacturing Enterprise Survey 
(GMES) 1994-95, and a specialised component designed to measure managers’ risk attitudes 
using an experimental gambling approach with real monetary payoffs. Joint estimation of 
profit and profit variance functions which control for unobserved heterogeneity support model 
predictions. Firms with more risk averse managers who face high risks have lower profit rate 
variability and lower mean profit rates. These mean and variance differences are economically 
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1. Introduction 
This paper uses data from experiments measuring risk attitudes of Ghanaian manufacturing 
firm managers to investigate the extent to which more risk averse managers who face high 
risks attempt to smooth profits at the expense of lower average profits. Firms can smooth 
profits by, for example, making conservative production or input choices, diversifying 
economic activities, or investing in flexible inputs and types of capital. These are ways for 
firms to attempt to protect themselves from adverse profit shocks before they occur. The 
benefits to risk-averse producers in terms of lower profit variance do not come without 
opportunity costs, however. As is well known from a mean-variance approach, since 
expected profits typically must be sacrificed for lower risk, profit smoothing will be costly. 
Following from insights in the agricultural household literature, profit smoothing 
will be more likely to occur when firms anticipate being unable to borrow or insure. Since 
credit and insurance markets in Africa tend to be weak, one can expect that profit 
smoothing may be particularly prevalent in African firms. This implies that the costs of 
risks will be high in Africa and that African firms present interesting cases to study these 
mechanisms. 
Another reason for the interest in exploring the effects of risk aversion on firm 
performance stems from the controversy surrounding the relationship between investment 
and uncertainty. For a risk-neutral, competitive firm, higher uncertainty increases 
investment, as long as the marginal product of capital is a convex function of the random 
variable. As this result seems paradoxical and inconsistent with reality, models of 
irreversible investment under uncertainty introduce an element of concavity, or asymmetry 
that lead to the opposite conclusion.
1 Note that these models assume that firms are risk-
neutral. In addition to irreversibility, however, it could also be that risk aversion plays a 
role. For example, Nakamura (1999) shows theoretically that risk aversion is another 
mechanism that invalidates the convexity of the marginal product of capital and leads to a 
negative relationship between investment and uncertainty.  
We explore the effects of risk aversion and demand uncertainty on the level and the 
variance of profit rates. A puzzling finding for a panel of African firms, including firms 
from Ghana, is that rates of return on capital (both median and marginal) are relatively 
high, while investment levels are quite low. (Bigsten et al., 1999a,b; Gunning and 
Mengistae, 1999). The explanation that has been proposed is that this situation reflects the 
high risks and uncertainties facing African firms. However, if managers are risk averse, 
this may contribute to a reluctance to invest even given relatively high profit rates. It may 
also be that managers require even higher rates of return, attainable only if they were doing 
less profit-smoothing. 
Finally, Teal (1999) has shown that although the real value-added of the Ghanaian 
firms in this dataset grew significantly during 1991-95, there was no contribution to growth 
from technical progress. Another longer-run potential cost for risk-averse firms choosing 
safe, low risk, lower return portfolios of activities is a reluctance to adopt newer, riskier 
technologies. This behaviour may be contributing to a less dynamic and less sustainable 
growth process for the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
1 Using the same Ghana data set as in this paper, Pattillo (1998) found that irreversibility was an 
important determinant of the negative investment-uncertainty relationship.   1 
In this paper we measure managers’ risk attitudes using data from an experimental 
gambling approach with real payoffs that was added as a component to an ongoing panel 
survey of Ghanaian manufacturing firms. The first step in our empirical analysis is to 
examine whether these firm specific risk aversion measures are correlated with firm and 
managerial characteristics. Next we develop an empirical model in which the profit rate 
and variance are jointly estimated, and investigate whether managers facing high risks and 
with high risk aversion trade-off lower profits for more stable ones. One important feature 
of this model is its ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity in a flexible manner.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the underlying theoretical 
framework, while Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics, including details 
on the experiments measuring risk attitudes. Section 4 first empirically models the 
determinants of risk aversion, and then estimates profit and variance functions, controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. Section 5 summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
African firms face a highly risky environment. Risks stem from, for example, uncertainty 
about demand, price and exchange rate volatility, difficulties in contract enforcement,
2 and 
unreliable infrastructure, notably electricity. Following Alderman and Paxson (1992), we 
can distinguish between two broad classes of strategies by which agents can mitigate the 
consequences of risk. The first stage is risk management, where in the absence of perfect 
insurance markets, households or firms undertake actions to reduce ex ante income 
variability. Ex post, after income is realised, households or firm managers employ risk 
coping strategies that smooth consumption intertemporally by savings and across units 
though risk-sharing arrangements. 
A few recent papers have focused on the responses of African firms to the types of 
risks noted above. Fafchamps et al. (2000) show that Zimbabwean firms hold higher liquid 
assets and inventories in response to high levels of contractual risk. Using a multi-African 
country data set, Bigsten et al. (1999c) report results indicating that workers help their 
employers to smooth profits by accepting more variable wages in return for a wage 
premium, a strategy of sharing risks within the firm. Both of these studies provide evidence 
of risk management by firms. One risk coping mechanism that has been studied is 
Ghanaian firms’ sharing of risks in business networks by accepting late payment and 
building in other contract flexibilities to account for excusable breaches due to unforeseen 
shocks (Fafchamps, 1996). However, while evidence is accumulating on the mechanisms 
through which African firms manage and cope with risk (e.g. by inventory adjustment, 
offering a wage premium, or by forming networks), there has been no direct exploration of 
the primary implication of risk management. Here we test directly the extent to which 
managers facing high risks and with high levels of risk aversion trade-off lower profits for 
less variable ones.  
Several agricultural household studies have analysed, theoretically or empirically, 
the mean-variance trade-off for income (Dercon, 1996; Morduch, 1994; Adam and 
O’Connell, 1998). Under the assumption that households allocate labour between a risky, 
                                                 
2 One consequence of difficulties in contract enforcement is that input quality and timeliness of delivery 
are subject to uncertainty.  2 
high-return activity and a safer, lower-return one, these studies have shown how the share 
devoted to the safer activity is increasing in the relative riskiness of the second activity, 
and in the household’s degree of risk aversion. Further, if risk aversion is decreasing in 
wealth, higher wealth lowers the allocation to the safer activity.  
The parallel issue for firms has been less explored. Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
(1993; henceforth RB), however, develop a framework in which entrepreneurs maximise 
expected utility derived from the profit streams of the firms, where expected utility is 
dependent on the first two moments of consumption. In particular, RB assume that the 
manager chooses a “portfolio” of activities, or types of capital inputs, which together with 
a productivity shock influence the mean and variability of profits. The extent to which 
variation in profits feeds into variation in consumption depends on the entrepreneur’s 
ability to engage in borrowing or lending, or to buy or sell personal durable assets to 
smooth consumption, reflected in wealth. From the first order conditions of the problem, it 
can be shown that for each production activity, there must be a positive association 
between its marginal contribution to mean profitability and to profit variability.
3 Hence, 
when an entrepreneur shifts resources to the more risky production activity, it induces a 
rise in average profitability.  
  There are several possible reasons why the mechanisms discussed by RB may be 
relevant for our sample of Ghanaian manufacturing firms, hence possibly leading to mean-
variance trade-offs in profits.
4 We will list some here. Firstly, the firm could choose to 
produce a line of lower-return, standardised products, with set prices, rather than venturing 
into more customised, differentiated products. While the latter types of products have 
potentially higher return, there is more uncertainty about customer demand and selling 
prices. Secondly, the production process could be organised to use inputs that provide 
greater flexibility to respond to shocks, but may generate lower returns. Greater use of 
casual workers may be one example. Thirdly, the firm could invest in some assets that 
have higher but more risky returns stemming from, say, the uncertainty of power supplies. 
This may apply to the outcomes of employing electric sewing machines versus foot-
pedalled ones in the garment sector, or oil or electric powered saws versus hand-saws in 
the wood products firms, for example. Fourthly, the firm could engage in greater horizontal 
or vertical diversification. In diversifying, a firm is likely to lose possible gains from 
economies of scale and accept lower returns while gaining in terms of risk reduction.
5 A 
final example of the type of trade-off involves the choice of intermediate inputs. While 
some inputs may be generally of lower quality, and thus lead to lower average profitability, 
their delivery at the time promised may be more certain, lowering profit variability. The 
case of some types of domestic versus imported inputs may be relevant. 
In Section 4 we empirically explore three of the implications of the RB model. The 
first is that in a context where all uncertainties are not insurable, more risk-averse 
entrepreneurs will choose activities that lead to lower profit variance and lower average 
profits per unit of capital. To test this we are fortunate to have some direct information on 
                                                 
3 That is, a mean-variance trade-off. If this is not the case, there will be corner solutions where the 
manager allocates zero-shares to some activities (alternatively, possibly a unity-share to one single activity).  
4 RB use data on Indian farms to test their theory. It should also be noted that this is one of the few 
studies that provides information on the costs of risk reduction, in terms of foregone average profits. 
5 However, there certainly may be cases where diversification leads to higher profits, depending on 
other factors such as the firm size, age, and type of industry.  3 
managers’ risk attitudes, obtained from an experimental gamble with real payoffs, added as 
a component to the GMES. The second hypothesis that we will test is that greater 
uncertainty, due to a higher standard deviation of exogenous shocks, results in shifting 
more to the safer activity, such that average profitability and profit variability are reduced. 
To this end, we will use unusually detailed data on managers’ expectations about demand 
for the firm’s products, which can be used to create a measure of subjective uncertainty. 
The third theoretical implication is that, if wealth facilitates ex post consumption 
smoothing and if relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, managers without large 
(fixed or liquid) assets will be more willing to sacrifice income for less variability.
6 In the 
empirical analysis we are somewhat limited in our ability to test the latter implication 
because there is little information in the data set on managers’ wealth or opportunities for 
ex post consumption smoothing. However, we include measures of the potential for selling 
personal durable assets as a proxy for these opportunities. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The Ghana survey has collected panel data for the five-year period 1991-95 for a sample of 
approximately 200 manufacturing firms.
7 We distinguish between four industrial sectors: 
food and bakery, wood and furniture, textiles and garments, and metalworking and 
machinery. The firms are located in the four cities of Accra (the capital), Cape Coast, 
Kumasi, and Takoradi. Since the lottery and expectations data were only collected in the 
1994-95 survey, and only for small and medium sized firms, we will focus on a sub-sample 
of the full dataset covering the 1994-95 period for 78 firms. All these firms are privately 
owned. In terms of employment, the largest of these employ 160 people, and the smallest 
has one employee. For details on the sample selection and variable definitions, see the 
Appendix. Sample statistics are shown in Table 1. 
  Table 1 contains sample statistics of two profit measures which we will look further 
into in the econometric analysis below, the profit to output ratio and the profit to capital 
ratio. One distinguished feature of both measures is that the median is smaller than the 
mean, suggesting that the distribution of profit rates is skewed to the right. Indeed, when 
observations are pooled the estimated sample skewness is equal to 2.17 for the profit to 
output ratio and 2.48 for and the profit to capital ratio.
8,9 Further, it is clear that the average 
return to capital is strikingly high, usually larger than 100%. This is a feature of African 
manufacturing firms that has been documented in the literature (Bigsten et al., 1999a). 
Bigsten et al. suggest that this situation reflects the high risks and uncertainties facing the 
firms. As a first step towards examining the extent to which there are mean-variance trade-
                                                 
6 The third of these implications has also been highlighted in the agricultural household literature. In 
particular, it has been shown that households’ differing abilities to smooth consumption ex post will affect 
the attractiveness of using portfolio diversification, with its attendant costs, to reduce income variability. 
Households more likely to be credit constrained in the future, or without large stocks of liquid assets, will be 
more inclined to trade income variability for stability (Dercon, 1996, Morduch, 1990). 
7 See Teal (1998) for details on the survey. At the time of writing, the first three waves of the data can 
be downloaded from the web at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/.  
8 For a symmetric distribution, skewness is zero. 
9 For the profit to output ratio, the high skewness number is largely generated by four observations with 
extremely high profit rates. When these are eliminated from the sample, the skewness number decreases to 
0.68.  4 
offs in profits, we computed firm specific means and standard deviations of profits, and 
calculated their correlation.
10 The correlation is 0.58 for the profit to output ratio and 0.66 
for the profit to capital ratio. Both estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level of significance. Positive correlation between the mean and the standard deviation is 
consistent with the mechanisms discussed in Section 2.  
  One unusual feature of the GMES 1994-95 data set is that it contains experimental 
data on managerial risk aversion. Following Binswanger (1980), these data were obtained 
by asking respondents to choose between seven lotteries with varying expected return and 
variance, where higher return can only be obtained by accepting higher variance. Table 2 
shows the details of the experiment. Once the respondents chose a lottery, a coin was 
tossed and they received the outcome indicated by heads and tails in the table. Hence, an 
individual who chose Lottery 1 simply got 1,000 Cedis regardless of the outcome of the 
coin toss; someone choosing Lottery 2 got 900 Cedis on heads and 1,900 Cedis on tails, 
and so on. Lottery 7 is the high-risk, high-return alternative where the respondent would 
get nothing on heads and 4,000 on tails. Given the design of the experiment we can 
compute two measures of risk preferences. First, we calculate intervals for the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion, denoted S, assuming the underlying utility function to be 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 S x x U
S − − =
− .
11 Second, we compute intervals for the “slope”, denoted Z, of the 
trade-off between expected return and standard deviation. These measures are shown in the 
right part of Table 2. 
  The game was first played without giving the actual payoffs (hypothetical), and 
then for real money. It was clear that the respondents enjoyed this part of the survey. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of lottery choices, based on the gamble with real 
payoffs.
12 Clearly there is substantial variation in the data. Twenty-one percent of the 
managers chose the risk-free alternative giving a certain outcome of 1,000 Cedis. 
Lotteries 2-4 each attracted between 15% and 20% of the respondents, whereas 
Lotteries 5 and 6 were less popular. The most risky lottery (Lottery 7) was chosen by 
18% of the respondents. Hence, our sample contains individuals who appear to be very 
risk averse, and others who are quite willing to take risks. In Section 4 we will explore 
if this variation in risk attitudes maps into variation in profitability, according to the 
prediction of our theoretical framework. 
  We maintain that the lottery experiment is a good method for eliciting information on 
managers risk preferences. Another alternative for measuring risk attitudes that has been 
tried is interviews that pose choices between hypothetical but realistic production 
alternatives, geared to finding certainty equivalents of risky prospects. Binswanger (1980) 
shows that this method is subject to interviewer bias and unstable results when individuals 
are resurveyed. In more recent literature, risk aversion parameters have been estimated as 
part of often complex structural models. There still appears to be some advantage to the 
                                                 
10 For this computation we used data spanning the period 1991-95, in order to compute the standard 
deviation as accurately as possible. 
11 That is, with constant relative risk aversion. 
12 Fifty-seven individuals chose the same lottery when the game was played for real money as they had 
chosen in the hypothetical game. Twelve individuals switched to a less risky lottery, and nine switched to a 
more risky lottery, when the game was for real money. In the remainder of this analysis we will use the data 
from the actual gamble.  5 
lottery experiments, however, since the method is more direct and does not rely on model 
or estimation assumptions.  
  Two key aspects of the lottery design are that participants receive actual monetary 
payoffs, and that the payoff size is large relative to average incomes. One frequent 
objection to these types of experiments is that the lottery’s ability to measure risk attitudes 
is fatally compromised because it does not subject the individual to actual losses.
13 In 
response, Binswanger (1981) argues that opportunity losses are theoretically equivalent to 
real losses in utility-based models. In addition, the rural India experiment also tested giving 
the participants money some days before, so that when they played the lottery game they 
put these funds at risk, and found no statistical differences in choices. The conclusion was 
that participants treated opportunity losses much like real losses. 
  Another unusual element of the GMES dataset is that fairly detailed data on 
managers’ expectations were obtained. Managers were asked about their one-year and 
three-year ahead expectations of demand for their firms’ products. However, rather than 
only asking for point estimates, i.e. what percentage change they expected, firms were 
asked to assign probabilities to a range of potential percentage changes in demand, so that 
the probabilities summed to 100.
14 For instance, a manager believing that there was an 
equal likelihood that demand would either increase by 0-10%, by 10-20%, or by 20-30%, 
would put weights of 33.3 in each of these intervals. Pattillo (1998) has used these data in 
analysing investment behaviour, and here we will use them to analyse profits, in terms of 
levels and variance. Focussing on managerial uncertainty, we compute each manager’s 
one-year ahead subjective variance of expected demand growth.
15  The frequency 
distribution of this variable is shown in Table 3. Most managers appear to be relatively 
certain about one-year ahead demand, as 55% of them have a subjective variance less than 
10%. Some firms however have very high variances, sometimes ranging over 50%.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
Before turning to the analysis of the consequences of risk aversion, we examine how firm 
and managerial characteristics are correlated with risk aversion. This is an issue which has 
not been subject to much empirical analysis in the literature. Binswanger (1980) surveyed 
Indian farmers using an experimental gamble approach similar to that described above. 
Based on the lottery selections made by the respondents, Binswanger computed point 
estimates of partial risk aversion coefficients and regressed these (in logarithms) on various 
personal characteristics such as gender, occupation, age, income, financial and non-
financial assets, and schooling. Coefficient estimates from six models were reported, and 
the results were somewhat mixed with coefficients not always being significant. 
Nevertheless, to summarise the main results, risk aversion was found to be negatively 
associated with wealth, assets, schooling (proxying “human wealth”), and positively 
related to age (except possibly for games at high stakes). More recently, Donkers and van 
                                                 
13 Of course, this objection ignores the fact that in low-income countries, it would be infeasible and 
undesirable to implement surveys where participants lose their own money. 
14 These ranges were as follows: decrease by more than 30%; decrease by 20 to 30%; decrease by 10 to 
20%; decrease by 0 to 10%; no change; increase by 0 to 10%; increase by 10 to 20%; increase by 20 to 30%; 
increase by more than 30%. 
15 Details on how this was calculated are shown in the appendix.  6 
Soest (1999) have analysed how a subjective measure of risk aversion from a Dutch 
household survey is related to household characteristics.
16 They find that women are more 
risk averse than men, and that risk aversion is increasing in age and in one of their two 
cross-sections, somewhat surprisingly, in income, which is a proxy for wealth. 
 
4.1 Determinants of Risk Aversion 
To analyse the determinants of risk aversion we first need to decide how to treat the 
dependent variable. Since the lotteries are ordered from the least to the most risky gamble, 
we will use an ordered probit. To avoid having too many parameters in this model, and in 
the models below, we group the seven lottery choices (see Table 2 and Figure 1) into three 
risk aversion dummy variables: “high risk aversion”, which will be equal to one if the 
respondent chose Lottery 1 or 2; “intermediate risk aversion”, equal to one if the 
respondent chose Lottery 3 or 4; and “low risk aversion”, equal to one if the respondent 
chose Lottery 5, 6 or 7.
17 Accordingly, the ordered probit model can be written  
(1)  i i i w RA ν θ + ′ =
* ,  
where we observe risk aversion category: 
, A   if      3
; 0   if      2


















and where w is a vector of explanatory variables, ν is a normally distributed residual, and 
τ1 is a threshold parameter to be estimated jointly with the parameter vector θ. Drawing on 
the modelling strategy of Binswanger (1980), we hypothesise that age, education, and 
assets are determinants of risk aversion, basically because they are proxy variables for 
physical and human wealth. Wealth, in turn, is expected to be positively correlated with 
willingness to accept risk. Further, we include working experience as another proxy for 
human wealth, and a parental background dummy for whether or not the main occupation 
of the respondent’s father was running a business. The idea behind the latter variable is that 
parental entrepreneurship might be beneficial for both physical and human wealth (the 
latter for instance by providing managerial know-how).
18 Unfortunately, there are no data 
on managerial assets, so we use the replacement value of the firm’s capital stock as a 
proxy.
 19, 20 Finally, we add control variables for industry, location, and firm status.
21  
                                                 
16 However, the risk aversion measure in Donkers and van Soest is non-experimental and less 
sophisticated than that used by Binswanger and the one used in the current study. 
17 In a previous version of the paper we represented each lottery choice with a separate dummy variable. 
The grouping of lotteries here was based on the results obtained in that version. The previous results are 
available on request.  
18 Further, since running a business typically is associated with a higher risk than being an employee, 
parental entrepreneurship can be expected to be correlated with willingness to accept risk if risk attitudes are 
correlated between parents and their children. 
19 For almost all firms in the sample, the manager is also the owner.  7 
Ordered probit results are reported in Table 4. Due to missing data on one or 
several of the explanatory variables, the results are based on a sample of 67 firms (sample 
means and standard deviations are reported below the table). The capital stock is 
insignificant, but the coefficients on working experience, education, age of the manager, 
and father had business are all significant at the 10% level or better.
22 We find that the 
probability that a risky lottery will be selected depends positively on experience, education, 
and parental entrepreneurship, and negatively on age. Hence, an individual who is well 
educated, young, has some working experience in the current industry, and whose father’s 
main occupation was running a business will typically choose a risky and high-return 
lottery. Conversely, an individual with the opposite characteristics will typically choose a 
safe, low-return lottery. This seems intuitively plausible and it also squares well with the 
results reported by Binswanger. We tentatively conclude, therefore, that the gambling data 
contain valuable information on managers’ risk attitudes. 
 
4.2 Consequences of Risk for Profits 
In order to analyse the mechanisms discussed in Section 2, we will estimate profit 
regressions using the data described above on risk attitude and uncertainty as explanatory 
variables. Our empirical models will be of the form: 
(2)   () it i it it x h y ε µ γ β + ′ = 1 ,,     
where y is the dependent variable, h(.) is a function, β is a parameter vector associated with 
the vector of explanatory variables x, µ is a firm-specific random effect with mean µ  and 
variance 
2
µ σ , γ1 is a factor loading, and ε is a residual. We interpret the residual as an 
unanticipated shock to profits, stemming from underlying uncertainty of the kind discussed 
in Section 2. Because the firm manager can choose between a number of activities with 
different degrees of risk, he/she will effectively have some control over the variance of ε. 
As a result, the residual will be heteroskedastic; for instance, highly risk averse managers 
will typically choose activities with low risk, and the variance of ε will therefore be low for 
such firms. Hence it is important for our purposes to allow for a rich heteroskedasticity 
structure. Assuming that ε follows a normal distribution, we specify the variance as: 
(3)  () i it it z µ γ α σ σ 2
2 2 exp + ′ = , 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 There is no information in the dataset about managers’ wealth, which is unfortunate since this is one 
of the key variables in studies of risk attitude (e.g. Binswanger, 1980).  
21 We also tried with additional explanatory variables, such as a dummy for borrowing in informal 
credit markets, gender, and number of years of residence in the current town. However, none of these had 
significant coefficients. Because of the small sample size it is desirable to keep the model relatively small and 
simple, and therefore we have excluded these additional variables in the regression reported in Table 4. The 
results of the more general model are available on request. 
22 Industry experience is defined as firm age plus experience prior to founding or acquiring the business 
(see Appendix). When these two variables are entered separately, the null hypothesis that they have equal 
coefficients cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance (p-value = 0.93).  8 
where σ
2 is a constant, z is a vector of explanatory variables, α is a vector of parameters, 
and  γ2 is a factor loading.
23 This structure takes a very flexible stance, allowing the 
variance of ε to depend both on observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
  One important feature in equations (2)-(3) is the control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, through the random effect µ.
24 In order to integrate µ  out the of the 
likelihood function we will use a nonparametric approach suggested by Heckman and 
Singer (1984), where we take µ to follow a discrete multinomial distribution with M points 
of support, () M µ µ ,..., 1 , with the associated probabilities denoted  m PI . This approach, 
known as a discrete factor approximation, is flexible in that arbitrary distributional 
assumptions regarding the distribution of µ  are avoided, while at the same time it is 
relatively efficient compared to multiple-stage estimation procedures. In an extensive 
Monte Carlo study, Mroz (1999) reported results indicating that estimators using discrete 
factor approximations compare favourably to maximum likelihood estimators correctly 
assuming the distribution of µ to be normal, and that they perform much better than 
maximum likelihood estimators incorrectly assuming normality.
25 The likelihood function 
is given in the appendix. 
 
Empirical Models and Results 
To analyse the implications of managerial risk attitudes and uncertainty for profits we will 
run profit regressions of two kinds. The first does not follow from the firm’s profit 
maximisation problem while the second does. We begin by looking at the profit to output 
ratio, which essentially measures the degree to which the firm manages to generate surplus 
liquidity once operating costs have been covered. To the extent that the “portfolio” choice 
of activities affects profits, as predicted by theory, this will affect the profit to output ratio 
as well. Although not derivable from the firm’s maximisation problem, we believe that a 
regression of the profit to output ratio on a set of explanatory variables will be useful as a 
benchmark to which the second, more theoretically appropriate model, can be compared. In 
the second model the profit to capital ratio is the dependent variable. As shown in Section 
3, this variable exhibits considerable skewness which may cause problems in estimation in 
the sense that the observations at the far end of the tail may heavily influence the regression 
results. Further, it does not seem unlikely that this skewness in fact is generated, at least to 
some degree, by measurement errors in the capital stock.
26 The profit to output ratio is less 
skewed (see footnote 9) and it is likely to be less sensitive to measurement errors since it is 
                                                 
23 A more restrictive version of this heteroskedasticity model, not allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity, is discussed by Greene (1993), pp. 401-402. For applied work using the latter model, see e.g. 
Fafchamps and Pender (1997). 
24 The factor loading technique means that we effectively allow for correlation between the unobserved 
mechanisms affecting the variance of the residual and those affecting profits (positive correlation is indicated 
by γ1 and γ2 having equal signs, and vice versa). This is attractive for many reasons; for instance, if our data 
on risk aversion only partially measure true risk aversion (so that a portion of risk aversion remains 
unobserved), one would expect this correlation to be positive, due to the mean-variance trade-off. 
25 The empirical literature based on discrete factor approximations is growing rapidly. See for instance 
Moon and Stotsky (1993), Blau (1994), Ham and LaLonde (1996), and Deb and Trivedi (1997). 
26 Clearly, whenever the reported value of the capital stock is substantially lower than the true value, the 
profit to capital ratio will be heavily inflated.   9 
a flow-flow variable, rather than flow-stock. Therefore, we feel that by investigating both 
the profit to output ratio and the profit to capital ratio, we will be able to draw more robust 
conclusions than had we focused on either one alone (provided of course that the two do 
not give too conflicting results). 
  The theory discussed in Section 2 predicts that the inter-firm variation in managerial 
uncertainty and risk attitudes, documented in Section 3, will map into inter-firm variation in 
the composition of activities, with mean-variance effects on profits. In the empirical 
analysis that follows, we will use the subjective variance to represent managerial 
uncertainty, and the lottery choices to proxy risk aversion. Another implication of theory 
concerns wealth effects. If wealth facilitates ex post consumption smoothing or if relative 
risk aversion is declining in wealth, then the RB model outlined in Section 2 predicts that 
an increase in managerial wealth will be associated with a portfolio shift into high-risk and 
high-return activities. Although the data on managerial wealth are scanty as touched upon 
above, we do have information on whether or not the manager owns a house and a motor 
vehicle. We will use these to proxy wealth. 
  In our first model we take the profit to output ratio to be a linear function of the 
managers’ subjective variance, 
E
i V , the risk aversion categories RAk , k = 1,…,3, with the 
riskiest selection RA3 as the omitted category, and the dummy variables for house and 
motor vehicle ownership, denoted HO  and  MO, respectively. We add the capital stock 
(measured in logarithms), k, partly to proxy wealth effects and partly to control for firm 
size, along with control variables for industry, firm status, firm age, location, and time.
27 
Adding finally the unobserved firm effect µ and the residual, the reduced-form 
specification can be written
28 
(4)  it i it
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We choose a similar set of variables for the variance function, the only difference being the 
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  Regression results, based on three support points, are shown in Table 5.
29 In Column 
(a) we have estimated the model without including the risk aversion variables, in order to 
provide a benchmark. In the profit equation we see that our proxy variables for wealth, i.e. 
                                                 
27 Note that we take both risk aversion and uncertainty, as measured by the lotteries and the subjective 
variance, to be time invariant. This is perhaps not strictly correct, but it does not seem too strong to assume 
these variables to be slow changing, so over such a short period as two years it will probably not lead to too 
misleading results.  
28 As explained in the appendix, estimation of the model requires some normalisations. One is to set γ1 = 
1, which is reflected in (4).  
29 There are no well-established criteria for determining the number of support points M in models like 
these (see e.g. Heckman and Walker, 1990), so we follow standard practice and increase M until there are 
only marginal improvements in the log likelihood value. For the regressions shown in Table 5, the addition of 
a fourth point yielded only a minor increase in the log likelihood value, and the estimated probability 
coefficient associated with the fourth point was very close to zero.  10 
the capital stock, and the dummy variables for owning a house and a motor vehicle, have 
positive coefficients, where those on capital and motor vehicle are significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level or better. This squares with the theoretical implications, as 
discussed above. Further, managerial uncertainty, as measured by subjective variance, has a 
negative and highly significant effect on profits, consistent with the prediction that 
increasing uncertainty generates a shift to less profitable activities.  
  In the variance equation we obtain a positive and significant (at the 5% level) 
coefficient on owns motor vehicle, whereas the estimated coefficients on owns house and 
the capital stock are insignificant. Subjective variance is highly significant and enters with a 
negative sign, consistent with the notion that the firm will attempt to reduce portfolio 
variability when uncertainty increases. Finally, the unobserved heterogeneity estimates 
strongly indicate that heterogeneity is present, and that there is a positive correlation 
between unobserved factors affecting variance and factors affecting profits. This too is 
consistent with the risk aversion framework for reasons discussed above. 
  We now turn to the second version of the profit to output regression, which include 
the risk aversion variables as regressors (as measured by the lottery data, where the 
grouping is as described in Section 4.1). Since the least risk averse category is the omitted 
dummy, we would expect the coefficients on the two lottery categories to be negative, with 
the coefficient on high risk aversion being smaller (i.e. larger, in absolute terms) than that 
on intermediate risk aversion. Regression results, reported in Column (b), strongly support 
theory in the sense that managers choosing the conservative gambles have lower profits and 
lower variance in the shocks to profit than less risk averse managers. The risk aversion 
coefficients are negative and highly significant in both equations. In the profit equation the 
coefficient on high risk aversion is larger than that on intermediate risk aversion, which is 
strictly not consistent with theory.
30 In the variance equation, however, the ordering is more 
in line with expectations.  
  As in Column (a), the estimated capital stock coefficient in the profit equation is 
positive and significant, whereas it is insignificant in the variance equation. Further, as in 
the previous regression, in both equations, owning a motor vehicle enters with positive and 
significant coefficients, and subjective variance enters with negative and significant 
coefficients. Neither of the coefficients on owning a house is significant. Finally, it again 
appears important to control for unobserved heterogeneity, since the estimated θ and the 
support point probabilities are highly significant. In contrast to the model in Column (a), 
however, the factor loading γ2 is insignificant, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity 
might be negligible in the variance equation, once we have controlled for risk aversion. 
  The next step is to examine how the above results compare to a model based on a 
theoretically more appropriate framework. Our second model is derived from the firm’s 
instantaneous profit maximisation problem: 
(6)  () () wL K L pAF w p
L
− = , max , π , 
where p is the (exogenous) output price, A is efficiency, w is the (exogenous) wage, F(.) is a 
production function, L is labour which is assumed perfectly flexible, and K  is capital, 
                                                 
30 The Wald test statistic that the two risk aversion coefficients are the same is equal to 11.4, hence we 
reject the hypothesis that they are equal.  11 
assumed quasi-fixed. For simplicity, we assume that the production function is Cobb-
Douglas with constant-returns to scale, which means that we can use the first-order 
condition for L and rewrite (6) as : 
(7)  () () () () () 1 1 1 , − − − =






where α is the labour elasticity in the production function.
31 We proxy variation in prices 
and efficiency across firms by the same control variables as above, and by the unobserved 
firm effect µ, and we control for temporal variation by using a year dummy. Further, we 
adjust (7) to allow for dependence on subjective variance and risk aversion. If all firms 
were risk neutral, these variables would be irrelevant and the associated coefficients would 
be insignificant. Finally, since firms occasionally make losses we assume the residual to be 
additive, with all the properties discussed above. Since the residual has mean zero this 
means that firms will have non-negative expected profits, yet actual profits may be negative 
due to a bad shock. With these adjustments of the theoretical equation, we write the 
empirical profit function as:  
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and we specify the variance function as: 
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One notable difference between equation (9) and (5) is that employment enters as an 
explanatory variable. The reason is that when modelling the profit to capital rate, we 
believe that it is important to condition the variance on firm size as it is likely that small 
firms have higher variation in their profit rates than larger firms.  
  Table 6 reports the regression results, based on five support points, for the profit to 
capital ratio model. Again we begin in Column (a) without the risk aversion dummies. In 
the profit equation the coefficient on subjective variance is negative, as expected, and just 
fails to be significant at the 10% level (the p-value is equal to 0.1006). Further, we note that 
the wage coefficient is negative in the profit equation as expected, but not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficients on owns house and owns motor vehicle are both 
insignificant. 
  In the variance equation, owns house enters highly significantly but with the “wrong” 
sign (negative), whereas the coefficient on owns motor vehicle is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. The estimated coefficient on subjective variance is negative, as expected, 
and significant at the 10% level. Somewhat surprisingly there is no significant size effect in 
the variance equation. One reason might be that our controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                 
31 To assess the appropriateness of assuming constant returns, we estimated the Cobb-Douglas 
production function directly. Regressing the log of value-added on employment, capital (in logs), and control 
variables for industry, location, and firm status, we could not reject constant returns in capital and 
employment at the 10% level (the p-value was equal to 0.82). Results are available on request.  12 
are sufficient to control for such mechanisms.
32 As in the regressions reported in Table 5, 
there is strong support for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the data. In fact, the 
log likelihood value of the model in Column (a) exceeds the log likelihood value of the 
model without unobserved heterogeneity by 126, which is clearly a considerable 
improvement given that only 10 additional parameters have been introduced in the 
heterogeneity model. As before, the factor loading in the variance equation is positive, 
indicating a positive correlation between the unobserved factors affecting profits and those 
affecting variance. 
  In Column (b) we add the risk aversion variables to both equations in Column (a). 
Clearly, the addition of these variables has substantial effects. Many of the coefficient 
estimates change quite dramatically, and the log likelihood value increases by 13.5 which is 
a large improvement given that there are only 4 new parameters. In the profit equation, 
owns house is now negative and significant, which runs counter to what we were expecting, 
whereas owns motor vehicle is positive and close to being significant at the 10% level (the 
p-value is equal to 0.104). Further, we obtain negative and highly significant (at the 1% 
level) coefficients on subjective variance and the risk aversion dummies. Hence, 
uncertainty seems to reduce profits, and firms which are run by risk averse managers appear 
to have lower profit rates than firms whose managers choose high-return and high-risk 
lotteries (the omitted category).
33 The estimated wage coefficient is still insignificant.
34 In 
the variance equation, we see that the coefficient on owns house still is negative, but now 
insignificant, whereas owns motor vehicle is positive and significant at the 1% level. As 
before, subjective variance is negative and highly significant, and so are the risk aversion 
dummies. 
  Turning finally to model specification issues, we focus on three questions. Firstly, 
given the correlation between managerial background variables and risk attitudes 
documented in Table 4 (the ordered probit), can we be reasonably confident that the 
significant risk attitude effects obtained in Table 6 (Column b) are not in fact driven by the 
omission of the background variables? We note that for the model in Column (a) there is 
strong support for omitted variable bias, as indicated by the reported Wald test.
35 However, 
this result may very well be due to the omission of the risk aversion variables. When the 
risk aversion variables enter the model (Column b), the test statistic for omitted variables 
shrinks dramatically, implying that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no omitted 
variables, at conventional levels of significance.  
                                                 
32 Indeed, when the model is estimated without unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficient on log 
employment in the variance equation is equal to –1.2, and significant at the 1% level. 
33 However, it is also clear that the coefficient on intermediate risk aversion is substantially lower than 
that on high risk aversion, which runs counter to the monotonic pattern predicted by theory. It is difficult to 
say whether this is due to imperfect mapping of risk attitudes into lottery choices, or because of some other 
data anomaly. Perhaps strict monotonicity is simply too much to expect from the data. Nevertheless, based on 
our results we can firmly reject the hypothesis that risk aversion is an irrelevant variable for the level and 
variance of profits. 
34 According to theory, the wage coefficient should be negative (see eq. 7), yet it is not unusual to see 
positive wage coefficients in the empirical literature (e.g. Westley and Shaffer, 1999). One reason advanced 
is that there are efficiency wages. 
35 As indicated in the table notes, missing values in the background variables have been replaced by 
sample means here in order not to lose observations.  13 
  Secondly, can we be reasonably confident that the risk attitude effects are not biased 
by endogeneity? This would be the case, for instance, if unobservable factors affecting risk 
attitudes were correlated with the unobservable factors affecting the level and variance of 
profits. To test for this we amended the random effect µ multiplied by an additional factor 
loading γ3 to the ordered probit specification in Table 4, and then estimated the probit 
jointly with the profit function in Column (b). A non-zero γ3 would then indicate presence 
of endogeneity of the kind just discussed. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that γ3 
is zero, as indicated by the very low z-value reported in Table 6. This suggests endogeneity 
not to be a problem here.  
  Thirdly, and finally, how well does our preferred model manage to replicate the 
sample data? In Figure 1 we show diagnostic plots, based on the results in Table 6, Column 
(b). Clearly, our model does a fairly good job in capturing the heavily skewed sample 
distribution of the profit rate. This relative success is to a large degree due to the 
nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity approach. When plotting actual versus fitted profit 
rates (Panel c in the figure), most of the points lie quite close to a 45 degree line (not 
drawn).
36 As expected, the largest residuals occur at large actual profit rates. A related issue 
concerns the assumption of the residuals being normally distributed, made in Section 4. 
Panel (d) shows the density of the standardised residuals. Judging from the plot, normality 
does not seem to be a very strong assumption. Indeed, when formally tested, normality 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance.
37 
  Based on the results in Tables 5 and 6, we conclude that variation in managerial 
uncertainty and risk attitudes will have economically important effects on the level and 
variance of profits. Focussing on the results in Table 6, Column (b), the coefficient on high 
risk aversion implies that a firm with a manager in this category will have an expected 
profit rate equal to exp(-0.59)=55% of the expected profit rate in a firm associated with one 
of the riskiest gambles. The corresponding number for intermediate risk aversion is 
exp(-1.39)=25%. Are these figures not too substantial to be realistic? We know from 
Section 2, and from other studies (e.g. Pattillo, 1998; Bigsten et al., 1999a), that there is 
considerable inter-firm variation in profit to capital ratios in African manufacturing. 
Therefore it does not seem unreasonable that explanatory variables may turn out to have 
quite pronounced quantitative effects. Further, it does not appear that these results are 
driven by the functional form of our model.
38 Next, in the variance equation, the coefficient 
on high risk aversion implies that a firm belonging to this category will have a standard 
deviation in shocks to profit around 35% of the standard deviation for the least risk averse 
firms.
39 The corresponding number for intermediate risk aversion is 18%. Again, these are 
substantial magnitudes. The subjective variance term finally, has a coefficient equal to 
                                                 
36 Regressing actual profit rates on predicted profits and a constant, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on predicted profits is unity at the 10% level of significance. 
37 The Shapiro-Wilk (1965) test statistic for normality, as reported by the STATA package, is equal to 
-0.578, and the associated p-value is equal to 0.72. 
38 To check functional form sensitivity, we assumed the error term to be multiplicative and log-normally 
distributed (instead of additive, as in eq. 17). We then estimated a log-linear version of the profit function by 
OLS (in this case we had to add a fixed constant to all profit rates so that there is no negative dependent 
variable). The estimated coefficient on intermediate risk aversion was –0.93, which is slightly less substantial 
than in Table 6 but still of considerable size, implying that the expected profit rate will be 39% of that of the 
least risk averse category.  
39 Calculated as [exp(-2.118)]
0.5.  14 
-0.32 in the profit equation and -0.84 in the variance equation. These estimates are readily 
interpretable as elasticities: a doubling in subjective variance, for instance, will reduce 
expected profits by approximately 1-2




5. Summary and Conclusions 
Ghanaian manufacturing firms operate in an environment characterised by high and, at 
least partially, uninsurable economic risk. As a consequence do firms trade-off lower for 
more stable profits -- the fundamental risk management strategy? In particular, can we find 
support for the prediction that inter-firm variation in managerial risk attitudes and in 
uncertainty will map into inter-firm variation in the composition of activities, with mean-
variance effects on profits? We have empirically examined these issues using the GMES 
panel data set, which contains extensive information on firm and managerial characteristics 
as well as data on managers’ risk attitudes and their subjective expected variance of 
demand. Our empirical method has two important strengths. First, consistent with the 
theoretical hypothesis, we estimate profit and profit variance functions jointly. Thus, the 
model is fitted such that the impact of managers’ risk attitudes and uncertainty (in addition 
to the other variables) on the mean and variance of profits is determined simultaneously. 
Second, we use a flexible, non-parametric approach to account for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. It is important to employ a rich heteroskedasticity structure, so that we do 
not attribute mean-variance profit differences to differences in managers’ risk attitudes, 
when there is actually unaccounted for inter-firm variation stemming from, say, differences 
in managerial ability.  
  We estimate models for two types of profit measures: the ratio of profit to output, 
and of profit to capital. The latter formulation follows from theory and empirical restricted 
profit function specifications, while the former is also useful given the skewness in the 
distributions of profit rates (profit to capital), and possible measurement problems for the 
capital stock. For both types of models we find that firms with more risk averse managers 
who face high uncertainty have lower profit variability and lower mean profits. Theory 
predicts that the higher the risk aversion indicator, the greater should be the attempt at 
profit smoothing (lower variance) with attendant lower expected profits. While the 
magnitudes of our estimated coefficients were not strictly consistent with this pattern, there 
was a marked tendency for mangers choosing more risk averse lotteries to be associated 
with larger negative effects on firm profit means and variances. The risk aversion 
coefficients were always jointly significantly different from zero, as was the managerial 
uncertainty measure (except for one case). 
  The results indicate that variation in managerial risk attitudes and uncertainty will 
have economically important effects on the level and variance of profits. The implied 
mean-variance differences for the most risk averse manager relative to the least risk averse 
are actually surprisingly large. We have not rejected these quantitative effects as 
unreasonable, however, as we know from other studies that there is significant inter-firm 
variation in profit to capital ratios in African manufacturing. 
  Although the data set contains very limited data on managerial wealth, we attempted 
to explore wealth effects by including dummies for whether the manager owns a house or a 
motor vehicle. If wealth facilitates ex post consumption smoothing or if relative risk  15 
aversion is decreasing in wealth, the theoretical framework implied that higher managerial 
wealth will be associated with a portfolio shift into high-risk, high return activities. We 
found that owning a motor vehicle was associated with higher profits and profit variance in 
six of the eight cases, while house ownership was generally insignificant.
40 One possible 
reason why the house ownership dummy did not work very well in the regressions could 
be that houses differ widely in values, reflecting widely differing wealth levels. Motor 
vehicles probably differ less widely in values, implying that the dummy for ownership of a 
motor vehicle would be a better wealth proxy than the dummy for house ownership. 
  If we accept these findings on the role of risk aversion in Ghanaian firms’ strategies 
for managing risks, there may be a number of important implications for other aspects of 
firm performance. First, in addition to irreversibilites, risk aversion may help explain the 
negative effect of uncertainty on investment; or be associated with low investment rates 
more generally. Second, it may be that risk aversion and the tendency to choose safe, 
lower-return, lower variance activities, as demonstrated in this paper, is associated with a 
reluctance to adopt newer, riskier technologies that may have contributed to the record of 
little or no productivity gains. Clearly, these are areas that remain to be explored. 
                                                 
40 An important finding of Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) was that the tendency to shift to a less 
risky, less profitable portfolio was greater for households with less wealth, and not as important for the 
wealthy, who have greater access to credit markets and buying and selling personal assets to smooth 
consumption ex-post. Over time, these patterns contribute to further widening of income and wealth 
differences.  16 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
       











Mean of firm 
means 
       
Profit  /  Output  0.17 0.15 0.07 0.23 0.17 
Profit  /  Capital  stock  5.50 1.88 0.68 6.08 5.65 
Employment 20.2  10  5  22.5  19.9 
Capital stock
  164,006  4,179  1,360  29,993  160,784 
Wages  983 712 352  1,340  997 
Firm age  14.7  13.5  6  20  14.7 
Foods
¤  0.20      0.21 
Textile
¤  0.29      0.30 
Metal
¤  0.28      0.27 
Wood
¤  0.24      0.23 
Accra
¤  0.43      0.42 
Solo or partnership
¤  0.80      0.81 
Year 1995
¤  0.51      
       
Observations  152 152 152 152  78 
       
Notes: 
Nominal values have been PPP converted to USD, see Table A.1 in Appendix. 
¤ Dummy variable.  20 





       
Lottery Heads  Tails  E  (x) 
 








1 1000  1000  1000 0  Extreme  ∞ to 7.51  1 to 0.80 
2  900  1900  1400  500  Severe  7.51 to 1.74  0.80 to 0.67 
3  800  2400  1600  800  Intermediate  1.74 to 0.812  0.67 to 0.50 
4  600  3000  1800  1200  Moderate  0.812 to 0.316  0.50 to 0.33 
5 400  3200  1800  1400  Inefficient     
6  200  3800  2000  1800  Slight-to-neutral  0.316 to 0  0.33 to 0.00 
7 0  4000  2000  2000  Neutral-to-negative  0 to  -∞  0 to  -∞  
Notes:  
In 1995, 1000 Ghanaian Cedis was equivalent to USD 2.44 (PPP adjusted). According to Bigsten et al. 
(1999), the average monthly earnings in Ghanaian manufacturing was equal to PPP USD 160 in 1994. 
Hence, a favourable outcome in Lottery 7 would correspond to a little more than one day’s average 
earnings. 




Table 3. Managerial Uncertainty of One Year Ahead Expected Output 
Subjective Variance (%)  Proportion of Firms 
0< ≤10  0.55 
10< ≤20  0.23 
20< ≤30  0.08 
30< ≤40  0.03 
40< ≤50  0.04 
>50   0.08 
  
Number of firms (N)  78 
  
Notes: 
See appendix for details on how subjective variance has been calculated. 
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Table 4. Ordered Probit Results for Lottery Selection 
         
  Coefficients    Effects on Predicted Probabilities 
# 
 
     ∆P(RA=1) / ∆X  ∆P(RA=2) / ∆X  ∆P(RA=3) / ∆X 
         

























Manager’s age  -0.034* 
(0.020) 















Owns house  -0.418 
(0.387) 
















Sole proprietorship or partnership
¤   0.429 
(0.492) 
















     
         
Constant   0.074 
(1.364) 
     
Threshold 1   0.969*** 
(0.181) 
     
         
Log likelihood  -64.4 
χ
2(10)  23.9** 
Number of observations (firms)  67 (67) 
         
Notes:  
Eleven firms were dropped from the sample due to missing values in at least one of the explanatory variables 
used in the regression.  
The numbers in ( ) are standard errors. The standard errors of the model coefficients are robust, calculated 
using the standard sandwich formula (White, 1982), whereas the standard errors of the marginal effects 
were generated by a simulation (see below). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
# Evaluated at sample means. For continuous variables the point estimates are marginal effects, and for 
dummy variables the numbers are the estimated probability changes associated with a discrete change 
from zero to one. To generate standard errors we drew a vector of random normal variates with mean 
equal to the coefficient point estimates, and covariance matrix given by the (robust) covariance matrix of 
the coefficient estimates. We repeated this process 1,000 times to generate distributions of the effects on 
probabilities. The reported standard errors are the standard deviations of the simulated marginal effects 
over the 1,000 replications. 
¤ Dummy variable. 
Mean values (standard deviations) of variables used in regression: Lottery group 1=0.39; Lottery group 
2=0.31; Lottery group 3=0.30; Log capital=8.7 (2.3); Experience=21.1 (13.7); Education=9.8 (4.3); 
Age=44.7 (11.3); Father had business=0.73; Owns house=0.40; Owns motor vehicle=0.36; Solo or 
partnership=0.82; Accra=0.43; Food=0.18; Textile=0.27; Metal=0.30. (Standard deviations omitted for 
dummy variables.)   22 
Table 5. Random Effects Estimates: Profit to Output Ratio and Variance 
         
  (a) Risk aversion excluded    (b) Risk aversion included
 
  Coefficient Std.  Error    Coefficient Std.  Error 
A. Profit Equation         
Constant   0.037  0.029     0.078*** 0.020 
Food -0.027*  0.015      0.006  0.014 
Textile -0.045**  0.018    -0.035*** 0.013 
Metal -0.063***  0.019   -0.036**  0.014 
Log capital stock   0.015***  0.002     0.014*** 0.001 
Solo or partnership   0.085***  0.018     0.088*** 0.005 
Firm age / 10   0.004  0.010     0.014*** 0.005 
Located in Accra  -0.061***  0.020   -0.033*** 0.011 
Year 1995   0.001  0.009     0.000  0.008 
Owns house   0.021  0.015    -0.006  0.013 
Owns motor vehicle   0.041**  0.017     0.038*** 0.008 
Subjective variance  -0.016***  0.004   -0.012*** 0.003 
High risk aversion        -0.064***  0.016 
Intermediate risk aversion        -0.102***  0.009 
B. Variance Function          
σ   0.078*  0.043     0.309  0.232 
Food   1.003**  0.417     1.607*** 0.582 
Textile -0.266  0.638    -0.299  0.564 
Metal   0.513  0.519     1.095**  0.528 
Log capital stock   0.088  0.142    -0.083  0.149 
Year 1995  -0.582  0.397    -1.796**  0.734 
Owns house  -0.968  0.755    -0.967  0.612 
Owns motor vehicle   1.567**  0.628     2.278*** 0.521 
Subjective variance  -0.803***  0.130   -1.024*** 0.162 
High risk aversion        -1.731***  0.522 
Intermediate risk aversion        -1.443***  0.443 
C. Auxiliary Parameters          
θ   0.210***  0.025     0.187*** 0.013 
γ1   1.000  ---     1.000  --- 
γ2   10.527***  3.424     1.920  3.405 
a1 -0.458*  0.276      0.009  0.167 
PI1   0.273***  0.075     0.556*** 0.107 
PI2   0.563***  0.110     0.306*** 0.088 
PI3   0.164**  0.065     0.138**  0.058 
      
     
Log Likelihood  161.2    171.0 
NT (N)  148 (77)    148 (77) 
         
Notes: 
Standard errors are robust, computed using the standard sandwich formula (White, 1982). Significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Four observations with extremely high profit rates (between 0.68 and 0.93) have been eliminated from 
the sample. In the estimation sample, the highest recorded profit rate is 0.48. Results including the 
four outliers are available on request.  23 
Table 6. Random Effects Estimates: Short-Run Profit Function and Variance 
         
  (a) Risk aversion excluded    (b) Risk aversion included
 
  Coefficient Std.  Error    Coefficient Std.  Error 
A. Profit Function         
Constant -0.115  0.624    -1.071*  0.558 
Foods -0.132  0.231      0.954*** 0.095 
Textile -1.095*** 0.164   -0.146  0.127 
Metal -0.290**  0.117      0.482**  0.204 
Log average wage  -0.052  0.057     0.052  0.069 
Solo or partnership   0.411**  0.181     0.549*** 0.167 
Firm age  -0.003  0.003     0.020*** 0.002 
Located in Accra  -0.214  0.177    -0.588*** 0.134 
Year 1995   0.009  0.170    -0.285**  0.139 
Owns house  -0.003  0.175    -0.179**  0.081 
Owns motor vehicle  -0.122  0.155     0.145  0.089 
Subjective variance  -0.101  0.062    -0.324*** 0.039 
High risk aversion        -0.591***  0.144 
Intermediate risk aversion        -1.392***  0.124 
B. Variance Equation         
σ   0.993***  0.321     0.229**  0.115 
Foods   1.261*  0.654     2.738*** 0.693 
Textile -1.296**  0.592      1.517*  0.840 
Metal -0.333  0.577      3.477*** 0.694 
Log employment  -0.433  0.296    -0.297*  0.180 
Year 1995  -1.110*  0.617     1.248*  0.665 
Owns house  -1.412***  0.482   -0.346  0.605 
Owns motor vehicle   1.254*  0.724     1.365*** 0.405 
Subjective variance  -0.310*  0.188    -0.841*** 0.221 
High risk aversion        -2.118***  0.454 
Intermediate risk aversion        -3.426***  0.533 
C. Auxiliary Parameters         
θ   7.181***  0.556     7.072*** 0.275 
γ1   1.000  ---     1.000  --- 
γ2   1.615***  0.142     2.014*** 0.148 
a1   1.469***  0.143     1.778*** 0.258 
a2   0.617***  0.198     0.803*** 0.093 
a3   0.013  0.151    -0.379*** 0.108 
PI1   0.058**  0.028     0.038*  0.022 
PI2   0.349***  0.078     0.344*** 0.065 
PI3   0.191***  0.065     0.325*** 0.063 
PI4   0.253***  0.059     0.217*** 0.054 
PI5   0.150***  0.047     0.077**  0.035 
         
Omitted variables
(a): χ
2(8)  22.14***   7.94 
Endogeneity
(b): z      0.08 
Log  Likelihood  -333.0  -319.5 
NT (N)  152 (78)    152 (78) 
         
Notes:  
Standard errors are robust, computed using the standard sandwich formula (White, 1982). 
Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
(a) Wald test of the hypothesis that manager’s age, education, industry experience, and the dummy 
for whether the father had a business can be excluded from the profit and variance 
specifications. To carry out the test without discarding observations, missing values in these 
variables were replaced by sample means.  



























Lottery 1 has the lowest expected return and variance, and Lottery 7 has the 
highest (see Table 2).  25 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagnostic Plots for Model (b) in Table 6  
 


















































To calculate the predictions we follow the approach outlined in Deb and Trivedi (1997), which is as follows. 
Conditioned on the estimated probability coefficients PI1,…, PI5 we calculate the posterior probability that 
observation yi belongs to class m=1,…,5 using the formula  () () j
c
ij j j m
c
im m f PI f PI µ µ ∑ . The highest 
probability for each firm indicates the heterogeneity class to which the firm belongs, and predicted values are 
then computed conditional on the appropriate class for each firm. 26 
Appendix 
A1. The Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis is a sub-sample of the 1991-1995 Ghanaian 
RPED/GMES panel data set, collected by a team from the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford, the University of Ghana, Legon, and the Ghana 
Statistical Office. With two exceptions, all empirical results in the paper are based on data 
from the two-year period 1994-1995. The first exception refers to the calculations of the 
correlations between profit means and standard deviations discussed in Section 3, which 
are based on the five years of data available; the second exception refers to the ordered 
probit results in Table 4, which are based on one year only (see notes below the tables for 
more details).  
  The experimental gambling data were collected in the 1994-95 survey for 91 small 
and medium-sized firms. We delete 13 of these due to missing data in key variables or 
substantial measurement errors (see below for sample selection criteria), leaving a sample 
of 78 firms and a total of 152 observations. We refer to this as the “Full Sample”. 
Whenever we report results based on fewer observations, this is indicated in the table 
notes. 
  The variables used in the empirical analysis are defined as follows. 
 i)  Profit. Calculated as output value minus the sum of costs for raw materials, 
indirect costs and wages.  
 ii)  Capital. Replacement value of equipment and machinery.  
 iii)  Wage. The total annual wage bill divided by the number of employees. 
 iv)  Employment. Total number of workers. 
 v)  Managerial uncertainty. Subjective variance of expected demand growth one year 
ahead, calculated from firms’ assigned probabilities to each of the following percentage 
changes in demand: decrease by more than 30%; decrease by 20 to 30%; decrease by 10 to 
20%; decrease by 0 to 10%; no change; increase by 0 to 10%; increase by 10 to 20%; 
increase by 20 to 30%; increase by more than 30%. To calculate the variance, we then use 
the formula 
2 2 ) (∑ − ∑ = j
E
j ij j j ij
E
i p v p V µ , where  ij p  is the probability assigned by firm i 
to interval j, and 
2
j v  and 
E
j µ  are the second moment (around the origin) and the mean, 
respectively, of the percentage change within interval j. Since we do not have within 
interval data, we assume a uniform distribution on [ lj, uj ], where lj and uj indicate the 
lower and upper bounds, respectively, of interval j. It follows that  ) ( 5 . 0 j j
E
j h l + = µ  and 
) 3 3 ( ) (
3 3 2
j j j j j l h l h v − − = . For the open intervals “decrease by more than 30%” and 
“increase by more than 30%”, we set the missing boundaries to 50%. 
 vi)  Lottery data. See Section 3. In Tables 5 and 6, “High risk aversion” is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the respondent chose Lottery 1 or Lottery 2, as described in Table 2,  27 
and “Intermediate risk aversion” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Lottery 3 or 4 was 
chosen. 
 vii)  Firm age. Number of years the firm has been in operation. 
 viii)  Managerial background variables. a) Industry experience: Calculated as firm 
age plus manager’s years of experience in the industry prior to founding or acquiring the 
firm. b) Education: Measured in years and derived from responses regarding the highest 
level of education completed by the entrepreneur, where primary = 6 years; middle 
school=10 years; secondary = 14 years; university=19 years; secondary plus vocational = 
15 years; and secondary plus polytechnic = 16 years. These definitions follow Teal (1998). 
c) Father had business: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s father has owned 
a business in manufacturing, trading, or farming, and zero otherwise. 
 ix)  Control Variables. Industry sector dummies are equal to 1 if the firm belongs to 
the indicated sector, and zero otherwise. Solo or partnership and Location in Accra are 
dummy variables equal to one if the dummy category applies for the firm or observation, 
zero otherwise. 
  All nominal values have been converted into real USD using PPP adjusted real 
exchange rates as reported by Bigsten et al. (2000). These numbers are shown in Table 
A.1. 
 
Table A.1 Exchange Rates and PPP:s, Ghana 1991-1995 
       
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
       
PPP  Consumption  (%)  40.1 37.0 31.1 25.8 34.1 
PPP  Investment  (%)  101.0  90.3 75.8 62.9 83.1 
Exchange  Rate  (Cedis/US$)  367.8 437.1 649.1 956.7 1200.4 
       
Source: Bigsten et al. (2000). 
  28 
A1.1 Sample Selection 
The lottery data were only collected for small and medium-sized firms, which involved 91 
firms. For some of these there are missing data on one or several relevant variables used in 
the analysis, and in a few cases there are apparent and sizeable measurement errors in key 
variables. Such observations were deleted from the two-year panel of 91 firms and 182 
observations, according to the following principles: missing data on any of the control 
variables in (ix) above (2 observations); missing data on the capital stock, profit, wages, or 
firm age (15 observations); more than 200 employees (2 observations); the capital to value-
added ratio smaller than 0.02 (7 observations); and missing data on subjective variance (4 
observations). The elimination of these 30 observations leaves a sample of 152 
observations associated with 78 firms. 
 
 
A2. The Likelihood Function 
The likelihood function of the model described in 4.2 is formed as follows. Conditional on 
the random effect, the likelihood contribution of firm j over the span of the panel t=1,2, is 
given by  































where  () j jt jt z µ γ α σ σ 2
2 2 exp + ′ =  from (9). Integrating this expression over the discrete 
distribution of the random effect yields the unconditional likelihood contribution 







j m j f PI f
1
µ , 
and maximum likelihood estimates are then obtained by maximising the sample likelihood, 
given by  ∏ =
i i f f . Hence the support points, the factor loadings, and their probabilities 
are estimated along with the other parameters of the model. To estimate the model it is 
necessary to impose some identifying restrictions. To this end we follow Blau (1994). First, 
due to the inclusion of an intercept in the model, only M-1 points of support for µ are 
identified. These support points are parameterised as  m m W θ µ = , where θ is a scale factor, 
W1 = -0.5, WM = 0.5, and  () () 5 . 0 exp 1 1 − + = m m a W , m = 2,…,M-1. Second, we set one of 
the factor loadings, γ1, to unity. Third, to constrain the probability terms to be non-negative 
and sum to unity, we specify appropriate boundary and linear equality constraints in the 
computer code.
41 
                                                 
41 These models are coded in SAS/IML. We use the built-in Newton-Raphson Ridge Optimization 
Method (NLPNRR) to maximise the likelihood function. We guard against convergence at a local maximum 
by using several different start values for each model. 